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DETECTION AND DISTRACTION EFFECTS
FOR THREATENING INFORMATION IN SOCIAL PHOBIA
AND CHANGE AFTER TREATMENT
R. M. Ban˜os, Ph.D.,1 S. Quero, Ph.D.,2 and C. Botella, Ph.D.2
This work examines differences in the detection and distraction by social-threat-
related information between a social phobia group (SP; N5 33) and a normal
control group (NC; N5 32). The change obtained after psychological treatment
is also studied for the SP group. A paper-and-pencil visual search task is used, in
which the emotional valence of the ‘‘target’’ (social threat, physical threat, and
neutral words) and ‘‘distractor’’ (social threat, physical threat, neutral, and
nonsense words) verbal stimuli is manipulated. Results indicate that there are
no differences in the detection of social-threat targets between SP and NC
participants. However, the performance of SP individuals is more impaired
when distractor stimuli related to social threat are presented, regardless of the
target valence. This increased distraction by social-threat-related stimuli
is reduced after psychological treatment, and this decrease is maintained at
6-month follow-up. Depression and Anxiety 0:1–9, 2007. & 2007 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
Fear is an emotion that has great value for an
individual’s survival. One of its central functions is to
facilitate the detection of danger or threats and to help
the organism respond quickly and effectively to
threatening situations. Therefore, it is not surprising
that attempts to understand how this emotion works
have been centered on the processes for detection of
the stimuli, that is, on the attentional process. In the
case of people with anxiety disorders, current cognitive
theories state that these individuals could have devel-
oped excessively ‘‘exaggerated’’ threat-detection pro-
cesses, which make them respond to scarcely
threatening cues [e.g., Beck et al., 1986; Bower, 1981;
Mathews and Mackintosh, 1998; Matthews and
Wells, 2000; Mogg and Bradley, 1998; O¨hman, 1996;
Williams et al., 1988, 1997].
On the one hand, a variety of tasks have been used to
examine biases in selective attention to emotional
stimuli. However, attentional tasks that do not include
competition between stimuli for attentional resources
have not found differences between anxious and
nonanxious people in the processing of threatening
information [e.g., Mathews and Milroy, 1994]. On the
other hand, experimental tasks presenting various
stimuli simultaneously have found these differences
[e.g., MacLeod and Mathews, 1991]. Therefore, it
appears that the problem lies not in the efficiency of the
threatening information per se, but rather in the
attentional priority given to a threat in preference to
other stimuli [Mathews and Mackintosh, 1998].
Although it has been proposed that this preferential
processing could partly explain the etiology and
maintenance of anxiety disorders, the mechanisms
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underlying this preference are not yet well delineated
[Amir et al., 1998; Bo¨gels and Mansell, 2004]. For
instance, Williams et al. [1988] suggested two mechan-
isms: the affective decision mechanism, which appraises
the threatening value of the stimuli, and the resources
allocation mechanism, which determines the allocation of
the processing resources. In the second version of their
theory, Williams et al. [1997] propose that the units
of information representing a threatening stimulus are
strengthened by carrying an emotional ‘‘tag’’ as a result
of biological preparation or prior learning. This tag
gives a threatening stimulus an advantage over any
competing one, thereby automatically increasing the
likelihood of triggering the secondary resources
allocation mechanism, thus leading to attentional bias.
If there is no competition, then there is no advantage
for a threatening stimulus. A single stimulus (threaten-
ing or not) would always have control of the output,
regardless of whether it has a tag.
Mogg and Bradley (1998) have also emphasized the
role of two systems with conceptually different func-
tions: valence evaluation (which is responsible for
assessing stimulus threat value) and goal engagement
(which determines the allocation of resources for
cognitive processing and action). According to these
authors, anxiety disorders are characterized by not only
a bias in the automatic initial orientation towards threat
but also action avoidance tendencies, which serve to
reduce the subjective distress and/or danger. There-
fore, after initially orienting to a threat, anxious
persons’ focus of attention is unstable, with a tendency
to shift repeatedly toward and away from the threat;
that is, the maintenance of attention to threat would be
subject to conflicting response tendencies: automatic
vigilance versus avoidance strategies [Mogg and
Bradley, 1998].
This vigilance–avoidance pattern has also been
suggested by Amir et al. [1996, 1998, 2002]. In the
specific case of social phobia (SP), these authors
suggest that processing biases could be characterized
by abnormalities in both automatic activation and
strategic inhibition of threatening information. This
hypothesis is consistent with clinical observations
indicating that these people attend preferably to
threatening information but are not successful when
they try to eliminate their negative thoughts.
The most common experimental tasks for assessing
the presence of attentional biases are those that present
two or more stimuli that simultaneously compete for
attentional resources. In these types of tasks, the
presence of the threatening stimulus may favor the
performance of anxious people (e.g., in the dot probe
task), or impair it (e.g., in the emotional Stroop task).
The ‘‘visual search’’ task has also been used. In the
first study using this experimental paradigm, Mathews
et al. [1990] asked the participants [patients with
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and normal con-
trols (NCs)] to discriminate between the words left and
right by pressing a button. The presence or absence of
a distractor (another word) that could be threatening–
nonthreatening, and the fact of knowing–not knowing
the location of the distractor and the target were
manipulated. Results showed that persons with GAD
responded more slowly and were more easily distracted
by the distractor words. They were especially dis-
tracted when the distractor words were threatening
(with no differences between physical and social
threat). However, this occurred only when the target
location was unknown, necessitating a visual search.
The authors replicated these results in a later work
[Mathews et al., 1995], in which they confirmed that
patient responses, compared to those of NCs, were
slower when the distractor words were threatening.
These authors also studied whether this bias disap-
peared after treatment, and although they did not find
positive results in their first study, data in the second
study indicated that the vigilance effects (i.e., distract-
ibility) did not persist after treatment.
The tasks mentioned thus far (Stroop, dot probe, and
visual tasks) are aimed at identifying a neutral stimulus
(a color, a dot, a word) by manipulating the emotional
valence of the distractor stimuli. However, these tasks
do not investigate what happens when the stimulus to
be identified is also threatening. To do this, some
authors have used the ‘‘face-in-the-crowd’’ paradigm,
in which facial expressions are manipulated. The
person is then asked to indicate whether all the faces
in a crowd (consisting of 8 or 12 persons) are the same
or whether there is some discrepancy. In nonclinical
populations, researchers using scores obtained in trait
and state anxiety have found differences in people’s
detection of threatening facial expressions [Byrne and
Eysenck, 1995; Hansen and Hansen, 1988; Hampton
et al., 1989]. In clinical populations, Gilboa-Schecht-
man et al. [1999] employed an SP sample and found
partial support for the attention bias hypothesis.
Participants with SP did not identify the negative
(angry) faces faster, but they needed more time to
identify the positive (happy) ones. Additionally,
although they were more distracted by the threatening
distractor faces than were NC participants, this also
occurred with positive distractors faces.
Rinck et al. [2003] have proposed two modified visual
search tasks based on the one introduced by Neisser
[1963]. These tasks allow testing for both selective
detection and selective distraction, with a full combi-
nation of targets and distractors. In both tasks, the
stimuli are words. In the first task, participants had to
search for a target word (anxiety-related or not) hidden
in a matrix of letters that also formed words (anxiety-
related or not). In the second task, each word was given
in its entirety, and the matrices consisted of single
words separated by blanks spread out across the screen.
The first task was applied to patients with GAD, to
patients with SP who were afraid of giving speeches,
and NC participants; the second task was applied only
to participants with GAD and NC participants. Results
failed to show either distraction or target detection
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effects in participants with SP. The authors recognized
that they had no convincing explanation for this result
and that it would require more research.
Our work is designed to analyze the performance of
people with SP when two sources of stimuli are
competing for the processing of resources. To this
end, a paper-and-pencil visual search task, similar to
the second version proposed by Rinck et al. [2003], is
used: The person has to find various target (neutral,
social-threat-related, and physical-threat-related)
words on a card that also includes distractor (neutral,
social-threat-related, physical-threat-related, and non-
sense) words.
First, we examine whether an SP group and an NC
group differ regarding distraction by social threat
information. We expected that when distractors and
targets belong to the same category, performance
would be affected for all participants. However,
whereas in the NC group social distractors affect more
social targets and less nonsocial targets, in the SP
group social distractors affect all targets (social-threat-
related, physical-threat-related, and neutral). Accord-
ing to the hypothesis, participants with SP will allocate
more attentional resources in the processing of social
threat than other distractors; therefore, this group
will be more affected by the social distractors. This
difference is not expected to be as notable for the NC
group.
Second, we examine whether there are differences
between the two groups in the detection of social threat
(target words). We expected that SP participants would
more quickly detect socially threatening information
compared to NC participants, especially when non-
social information is presented as distractors.
Third, we examine the bias specificity issue by
analyzing whether these biases in selective attention
of the SP group to threatening stimuli are limited
to social threat or whether they also extend to physical
threat. Last, we determine whether the attentional
biases are maintained after a cognitive-behavioral
treatment is applied and at 6-month follow-up.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The sample comprised two groups: a social phobia
(SP) group (N5 33) and a normal control (NC) group
(N5 32). Participants in the clinical group met DSM-
IV criteria [American Psychiatric Association, 1994] for
SP. Twenty participants in the SP group had general-
ized SP and the other 13 had specific SP. All of them
came from the Anxiety Disorders Clinic of the Jaume I
University of Castello´n (Spain). For the diagnosis, the
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule—Revised
[ADIS-R; DiNardo et al., 1988] adapted to DSM-IV
criteria was administered by doctoral-level students
supervised by expert clinicians. Afterwards, all partici-
pants received the treatment program described below.
The therapists were doctors or doctoral-level students.
All clinicians were trained in the delivery of
the manualized treatment protocols for the treatment
of SP.
Participants in the NC group were volunteers
recruited through announcements to take part in the
study. All of them underwent a screening interview to
rule out the presence of any mental disorder before
confirming their participation. They were matched to
the clinical sample in age, sex, and educational level.
Demographic characteristics of both groups are sum-
marized in Table 1. No statistical differences were
found between them in age, sex, marital status, or
educational level.
TABLE 1. Demographic characteristics and scores obtained in the questionnaires [M(SD)]
NC group SP group
SP group
posttreatment
SP group
follow-up
Male 9 11
Female 23 22
Single 24 25
With couple 8 8
Studies
University 17 22
High School 7 9
Primary School 8 2
Age 27.65 (11.71) 27.42 (11.35)
BDI 5.92 (4.72) 12.13 (8.28) 6.54 (7.23) 8.04 (10.01)
FNE 8.05 (6.67) 24.90 (3.81) 19.46 (8.21) 20.17 (6.68)
SAD 16.05 (6.98) 19.27 (6.99) 12.73 (6.57) 6.00 (2.73)
SPAI-SP 68.11 (35.67) 108.09 (26.67) 69.89 (21.29) 87.39 (41.02)
SPAI-AG 17.24 (11.94) 22.84 (12.71) 16.38 (9.77) 16.38 (9.77)
STAI-State 16.65 (7.88) 24.54 (9.29) 16.12 (7.89) 17.08 (7.57)
STAI-Trait 19.84 (8.35) 33.33 (10.67) 24.28 (10.78) 26.82 (13.02)
SPAI-SP, SPAI Social Phobia subscale; SPAI-AG, SPAI Agoraphobia subscale.
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VISUAL SEARCH TASK
We designed a pencil-and-paper visual search task.
Participants had to find two ‘‘target’’ words, which
were repeated a total of six times on a card. Each card
also included 66 distractor words (total5 72 words per
card). The words we used are presented in Table 2
(words presented originally in Spanish): 13 social-
threat-related words (11 distractors and 2 targets), 13
physical-threat-related words (11 distractors and 2
targets), 13 words related to objects that can be found
in a kitchen (11 distractors and 2 targets), and 11
nonsense words (all distractors). The emotional words
(physical and social threat) were pulled from the
published literature [e.g., Mattia et al., 1993; McNally
et al., 1990] and rated according to their adequacy to
each emotional category by seven independent judges
(expert psychologists in SP treatment). Only words
rated 7 or above (in a scale from 05Not related to
105Completely related) were included. All words were
matched on average letter length and frequency of use
according to Juilland and Chang-Rodrı´guez [1964]
word frequency norms.
On each card a unique emotional category for target
words (social threat, psychical threat, and neutral) and
distractor words (social threat, physical threat, neutral,
and nonsense) was used. All combinations between type
of target (three) and type of distractor (four) were
carried out, and these combinations were repeated
twice over a total of 24 cards. The two target words on
each card were repeated a total of six times in random
combinations: 3-3, 2-4, or 4-2. Each distractor word
was repeated six times per card (a total of 66 distractor
words). Cards of DINA 4 size were used, and the words
were printed in lowercase letters (Courier 14), placed
in six columns, each with 12 words. The locations of
both the distractor and target words were randomized
in all cases, so there were no identical cards. The
presentation of the cards was ordered so that neither
the type of distractor nor the type of target was
repeated twice in a row. In this fixed sequence a start
point was randomly determined for each participant.
Moreover, two practice cards were included with the
same structure, but the distractor words were always
a series of ‘‘s’s’’ of different lengths (e.g., ssss) and the
target words in both cases were susurro (whisper) and
siseo (hiss).
Participants were asked to find the target words as
fast as possible and to mark them with a pen. The card
was placed face down on the table, and the task began
when the person turned it over, and finished when the
person said ‘‘finished’’; the next card was then placed
face down. Time was measured in seconds with a
chronometer, by an experimenter who was blind to the
participants’ condition.
TREATMENT
A group cognitive-behavioral treatment program for
SP was applied, following the guidelines by Heimberg
[1991]. It comprised 14 weekly sessions, each with a
duration of approximately 2.5 hours. The therapeutic
components included (1) an educational component,
(2) a cognitive component (identifying and cognitive
restructuring of negative thoughts), (3) an exposure
component, and (4) a relapse prevention component.
PROCEDURE
Before the administration of the visual search task,
the SP group underwent two assessment sessions in
which we administered the ADIS-R and a broad battery
of questionnaires that assessed specific aspects of SP.
Participants with SP repeated the visual search task
after 14 weeks, just after the treatment program was
finished, together with the battery of psychological
tests. Three participants dropped out of the treatment
during the process. The task was again applied at
6-month follow-up along with the psychological tests,
but four of the participants could not be contacted. It
would have been preferable for NC participants to have
TABLE 2. Words (in English) used in the visual search task
Social Threat Physical Threat Neutral Nonsense
Distractor words criticism asphyxiation table galcion
taunt ambulance rag betesen
humiliation heart tray sefrina
stupid doctor cupboard hallison
rejection weakness glass mesolincia
shy attack spoon cajufes
idiot dizziness plate fozfal
clumsiness death sink lertasio
disdain heart beating chair drevia
insecure hospital drawer pasamica
shame emergency bucket quedrio
Target words ridiculous suffocation washing machine
silly heart attack fry pan
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also repeated the task in the same periods, to
completely rule out a practice effect. However, the
intersession time was quite long (14 weeks and 6
months), so is not probable that the practice effect
would have been maintained.
We assessed the NC group in a session designed to
rule out any current mental disorder. The visual search
task was applied in the same way as for the SP group.
Participants in both groups were administered the
Beck Depression Inventory [BDI; Beck et al., 1979],
the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory [STAI; Spielberger
et al., 1983], the Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory
[SPAI; Turner et al., 1989], the Fear of Negative
Evaluation Scale [FNE; Watson and Friend, 1969], and
the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale [SADS;
Watson and Friend, 1969]. Table 1 presents means
and typical deviations obtained in these questionnaires.
Score comparisons between the two groups showed
statistically significant differences for all questionnaires
except for the SPAI Agoraphobia subscale. When the
scores were obtained by the SP group in three
assessment periods (pretreatment, posttreatment, and
follow-up), significant differences for all questionnaires
were found between the first and the second periods
(pre- vs. posttreatment), and the first and the third
periods (pretreatment vs. follow-up period). Repeated
measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were applied
for all questionnaires and all Fs were statistically
significant [BDI: F(2, 44)5 6.127, Po.004; SAD: F(2,
40)5 4.567, Po.02; FNE: F(2, 40)5 3.678, Po.03;
SPAI-SP: F(2, 36)5 5.136, Po.01; SPAI-AG: F(2,
36)5 3.46, Po.04; STAI-S: F(2, 44)5 17.73, Po.001;
STAI-T: F(2, 44)5 9.39, Po.001].
RESULTS
First, we analyzed errors and omissions in each card.
Errors were practically nonexistent. As for omissions,
we found no differences on any card. For each
combination type of TargetType of distractor there
were two cards. Repeated measures ANOVAs for each
different pair type of cards were applied; we found no
differences in either the time employed between the
two cards or between the groups or the interaction
CardsGroup effect. Therefore, the mean of the two
equal cards, shown in Table 3, was calculated. Reaction
times above 2 standard deviations of the general mean
for each participant were considered outliers and were
deleted from the analyses.
COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE TWO
GROUPS (SP VS. NC)
We applied a repeated measures ANOVA 2 (group:
SP vs. NC) 3 (target: neutral, physical threat, and
social threat) 4 (distractor: neutral, physical threat,
social threat, and nonsense). This analysis revealed a
main effect for Target (F(2, 122)5 7.97; Po.001). Post
hoc tests revealed that all participants detected the
social target more quickly. A main effect for Distractor
was also found [F(3, 183)5 59.48, Po.001]. Post hoc
analyses indicated that the most interfering distractor
in the search was the one related to social threat, then
physical threat, with no differences between the neutral
and nonsense words distractors. The TargetDistrac-
tor interaction effect was also significant [F(6, 366)5
22.01, Po.001]. Although the social distractors inter-
fered the most, this interference was even greater when
the target to be found was also socially threatening.
When the group variable was considered, no
significant results were found for either the Group
main effect, or for the GroupTarget and Group
Distractor interaction effects. Nevertheless, a third
level statistically significant interaction effect, Group
TargetDistractor, was found [F(6, 366)5 2.08,
Po.05].
To more easily understand this third-level interac-
tion, we broke it down into comparisons of means.
Post hoc tests pointed out that the Group modified
the nature of the TargetDistractor interaction (see
Fig. 1).
In the neutral target condition, the SP group
responded much more slowly when socially threatening
TABLE 3. Means (standard deviations) of the reaction times in the visual search task (seconds)
Distractor Target NO SP SP posttreatment SP follow-up
Neutral Neutral 20.39 (5.11) 19.89 (4.93) 18.91 (3.76) 17.73 (3.48)
Physical 19.02 (3.48) 19.38 (4.49) 18.56 (3.84) 17.25 (3.47)
Social 18.15 (3.38) 18.948 (5.17) 17.92 (3.30) 17.09 (4.12)
Social threat Neutral 21.08 (4.28) 21.53 (5.04) 19.51 (3.63) 18.96 (4.19)
Physical 21.94 (4.63) 22.30 (5.95) 20.17 (3.73) 19.95 (3.80)
Social 22.89 (4.51) 23.01 (6.03) 21.04 (3.61) 20.23 (3.01)
Physical threat Neutral 20.89 (5.40) 19.90 (5.42) 18.82 (3.09) 18.03 (8.36)
Physical 21.74 (5.63) 20.80 (4.11) 19.08 (3.90) 18.77 (4.18)
Social 19.72 (4.37) 19.86 (4.68) 18.90 (3.80) 17.83 (3.88)
Nonsense Neutral 20.21 (4.95) 20.56 (4.61) 19.28 (3.68) 18.31 (4.44)
Physical 19.98 (5.03) 19.27 (4.43) 18.13 (4.15) 16.91 (3.27)
Social 18.69 (4.24) 18.58 (4.52) 17.87 (3.76) 17.123 (3.78)
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distractors were present than when physically threaten-
ing distractors were present, compared to the NC
group [F(1, 62)5 4.654, Po.03]. In the physical threat
target condition, the SP group also responded sig-
nificantly more slowly than the NC group when social
threat distractors were present than when physical
threat distractors were present [F(1, 61)5 4.509,
Po.04]. Finally, in the neutral distractors condition,
the NC group detected the social target faster than
the physical target, compared to the SP group [F(1,
61)5 3.93, Po.05]. The other comparisons were not
statistically significant.
SP GROUP COMPARISONS BEFORE AND
AFTER TREATMENT AND AT FOLLOW-UP
Visual search task means obtained at pretreatment,
posttreatment, and 6-month follow-up are presented in
Table 3. To analyze the changes that occurred after
treatment, we applied a repeated measures ANOVA 2
(Moment: before and after treatment) 3 (Target:
neutral, physical, social) 4 (Distractor: neutral,
physical, social, nonsense). The results showed that
the main effect for Distractor was significant [F(3, 87)5
44.797, Po.001]. The social distractors interfered with
the task most, followed by the physical distractors; no
differences were found between the neutral and
nonsense distractors. The TargetDistractor interac-
tion was also significant [F(6, 174)5 20.33, Po.001];
the social distractors’ interference was higher for the
social targets than the other targets. Last, the
MomentDistractor interaction was significant as
well [F(3, 87)5 3.49, Po.01]. Post hoc tests indicated
that differences between the two moments were only
found for the cards with social distractors, showing a
lower interference after treatment.
To test whether the results obtained after treatment
were maintained at 6-month follow-up, we applied a
repeated measures ANOVA 2 (Moment: pretreatment
and follow-up) 3 (Target: neutral, physical, and
social) 4 (Distractor: neutral, physical, social, and
nonsense). Again results showed a significant Distrac-
tor main effect [F(3, 75)5 42.854651, Po.001], and
a significant TargetDistractor interaction effect
[F(6, 150)520.34, Po.001]. Finally, MomentDistractor
interaction was also significant [F(3,75)5 4.09,
Po.001]. Post hoc tests again indicated differences
between pretreatment and follow-up for the social
distractors.
DISCUSSION
In general, the data obtained in this study indicate
that social-threat-related information is relevant for
participants with and without SP. This information is
not just detected earlier, but when it acts as a distractor
its interference is higher than when the distraction
belongs to another semantic category. Therefore, with
regard to our first aim in this work (the increased
influence of social distractors), the data indicate that
social-threat-related stimuli produce a higher inter-
ference than the rest of the stimuli in both groups.
However, there are differences between groups accord-
ing to the type of target to be found. In the SP group,
social distractors always affect all the targets more,
whereas in the NC group its effect is lower when
nonsocial targets have to be detected. It could be
argued that the increased distraction effect in SP
participants when socially threatening information is
present could be attributed to the capturing of
attention during the visual search.
Our results are partly in line with those achieved by
Mathews et al. [1990, 1995], who also used a visual
search task, although they employed exclusively neutral
targets, and found that participants with GAD were
slower than NCs in detecting them when the dis-
tractors were emotional. However, Mathews et al. did
not find differences between the physical- and social-
threat-related distractors, whereas in our study these
differences are apparent. This discrepancy between
studies could be due to the type of sample used;
whereas people with GAD could be affected by any
emotional stimulus, people with SP are especially
affected by social-threat-related stimuli.
The work by Gilboa-Schechtman et al. [1999] used
the face-in-the crowd paradigm in SP and NC groups.
However, these authors did not offer the global
comparison between the types of target faces (neutral,
angry, happy, and disgusted) and the distractor faces
or crowd (neutral, happy, and disgusted). On one hand,
they analyzed the role of the target by making four
specific comparisons and finding results favoring the
hypothesis of an attentional bias in SP only in two of
them: (1) angry and happy targets in a neutral crowd
(participants with SP were no faster than NCs in
identifying angry expressions, but they were slower to
detect happy faces), and (2) angry and disgusted targets
in a neutral crowd (participants with SP were faster in
detecting angry faces than disgusted ones, whereas
NCs did not show any difference). Gilboa-Schechetman
et al. also failed to find a faster detection of social
threatening faces (angry) in participants with SP.
To analyze the role of the distractors, Gilboa-
Schechtman et al. [1999] made six comparisons. Results
in favor of the hypothesis only appeared in two of
them: (1) angry targets in neutral versus angry crowds;
and (2) angry and happy crowds, when all the faces had
identical emotional expressions. These authors con-
cluded that participants with SP were more distracted
in angry than neutral crowds, but they also were more
distracted in happy crowds, which suggested a general
sensitivity toward emotional expressions. Although in
our work we do not use positive emotional stimuli, our
results also indicate a higher interference in SP for
social distractors. However, there is a discrepant result
in the study by Gilboa-Schechtman et al., because in
our case we did not find differences between groups
when the cards ‘‘neutral target–neutral distractor’’ and
‘‘social threat target–social threat distractor’’ were
compared. The characteristics of the type of task used
could justify this discrepancy. In our work, we did not
present facial expressions (clear hostility signs towards
the person); rather, we presented verbal stimuli
(arbitrary symbols of threat); we used 11 different
distractor words (whereas in the work by Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., all distractors were equal, with the
same individual showing the same facial expression);
and, finally, the subject was asked not only to detect the
presence or absence of the target but also its location.
Regarding the second objective of our work, faster
detection of social threat targets, the data indicate that
when this information is deliberately searched for, all
participants find it faster than when the information to
be found is neutral. If the information is related
to physical threat, its detection is also faster than when
it is neutral, but slower than when the information to
be found is social. Therefore, in contrast to our
prediction, participants with SP did not show an
increased detection of socially threatening stimuli; that
is, our results did not provide evidence of a cognitive
bias that facilitates the conscious detection of potential
threat cues in individuals with SP. Or rather, this bias is
not different from that shown by NC participants.
These data corroborate those obtained in the studies by
Gilboa-Schechetan et al. [1999] and by Rinck et al.
[2003].
In this work, participants with SP did not find social-
anxiety-related words faster than the other participants
(participants with GAD and NCs). However, Rinck
et al. [2003] also failed to find that participants with SP
were particularly distracted by social-anxiety-related
words. These authors recognized that this result was
surprising and not in agreement with results observed
for the very same participants in the study by Becker
et al. [2001] using a modified Stroop task. In that study,
participants with SP were distracted specifically by
speech-related words. Rink et al. [2003] offered no
explanation for this result.
The absence of differences between SP and NC
groups in the detection of social threat targets would be
against the presence of a bias along the whole
attentional process. Therefore, results obtained in this
work would indicate the importance of studying the
temporal course of attention toward the threatening
meaning in SP, and of differentiating between distrac-
tion and detection of threat. It could be maintained
that target detection involves strategic processes,
because it requires cognitive capacity and conscious
attention, and is subject to voluntary control. However,
distraction is related to automatic processes, because it
does not involve volition; that is, it is involuntary
[McNally, 1995]. Insofar as being involuntary is a
central attribute of automaticity [McNally, 1995], our
results could be said to show that participants with SP
show cognitive biases in automatic processes.
On the other hand, results obtained in our work are
consistent with those obtained when the emotional
Stroop cards task is used [e.g., Amir et al., 1996; Ban˜os
et al., 2005; Becker et al., 2001; Hope et al., 1990;
Lundh and O¨st, 1996; Mattia et al., 1993; McNeil
et al., 1995; Spector et al., 2003]. In this task, the
meaning of a word acts as a distractor. When the card
includes social threat words (i.e., the distractors are
related to social threat), the performance of people
with SP is slower, the same as occurs with the visual
search task. However, distractors are spatially separated
from the target in this study.
What this study adds to the data obtained with the
Stroop paradigm is that these differences between
groups are not observed when the main task also
demands attention to a socially threatening stimulus.
Therefore, it could be argued that people with SP
dedicate more involuntary attentional resources to
irrelevant socially threatening stimuli, leaving fewer
resources available for the main task. However,
when the stimulus to be found is also related to social
threat, this competition for attentional resources affects
NC participants equally; that is, the presence of a
cognitive bias in SP requires not only threatening
stimuli competing with the main task, but also
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stimuli of different emotional valence included in the
main task.
As for cognitive-behavioral treatment, the data
suggest that it is effective in reducing the attentional
bias toward socially threatening information. Although
performance at posttreatment still indicates that social
distractibility was the primary feature for participants
with SP, they showed reaction time differences before
and after treatment only when the distractors were
social. It seems that the treatment enables patients to
be less sensitive to this type of distraction. Further-
more, these results are maintained in a 6-month follow-
up period. However, caution is needed in drawing such
a conclusion: Although statistical change occurred, the
clinical relevance remains unclear, because social
distractor interference is still higher than when the
distraction belongs to another semantic category
(something that also happens for NC group). In any
case, and as McNally [1995] says, it remains to be seen
whether therapy is also able to inculcate positive biases
such as those in normal individuals, or whether it is
only limited to the neutralization or elimination of
negative biases. It would have been interesting to
administer the task in the NC group again, 14 weeks
later, to compare the results between the groups.
Despite this limitation, it is not very probable that the
practice effect in the task would have been maintained
in the SP group after 3.5 months.
Finally, a series of limitations that this work presents
should be mentioned. Perhaps because cards with
social distractors contain many threatening stimuli (66
out of 72 words), they induce anxiety in participants
with SP that influences their performance. However,
this argument would not explain why, precisely, in the
card where all stimuli are related to social threat
(distractors and targets), there are no differences
between the two groups (SP and NC). Another important
shortcoming is that the stimuli we used are words, and
in natural scenarios, isolated words infrequently con-
stitute a source of threat. Replication of the results
using more ecological stimuli, such as persons with
different facial expressions, would be needed. Also in
need of study is whether there are biases in the
detection of these expressions, and whether they occur
in the attentional maintenance phase.
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